HOUSING WEALTH AND U.S. MONEY DEMAND: A PANEL ESTIMATION

This article estimates a panel model for U.S. money demand using annual state‐level data for the period from 1977 to 2008. We incorporate housing wealth in the demand‐for‐money function and find strong evidence of a relationship between a broad monetary aggregate and housing wealth. This finding is robust to the inclusion of variables measuring financial heterogeneity across U.S. regions. Breaking up the sample in two subperiods shows that panel estimates including housing wealth yield more stable coefficients than both time‐series estimates and panel estimates excluding housing wealth. We also show that the link between money and housing wealth predates the recent boom‐and‐bust cycle. (JEL E41, E52)     

Information and Liquidity

We study how recognizability affects assets’ acceptability, or liquidity. Some assets, like U.S. currency, are readily accepted because sellers can easily recognize their value, unlike stock certificates, bonds or foreign currency, say. This idea is common in monetary economics, but previous models deliver equilibria where less recognizable assets are always accepted with positive probability, never probability 0. This is inconvenient when prices are determined through bargaining, which is difficult with private information. We construct models where agents reject outright assets that they cannot recognize, at least for some parameters. Thus, information frictions generate liquidity differences without overly complicating the analysis.     

The Economics of Internal Labor Markets

Our essay focuses on the economics of long-term contractual relationships between a firm and its employees, referred to as the internal labor market. We review the economics literature on match-specific investments, risk aversion, asymmetric information, and transaction costs. We argue that an integrated treatment of all four factors is needed in order to apply implicit contract theoy to internal labor markets. Integrating the topics also highlights the tradeoffs created among these factors. Our discussion stresses contract enforcement mechanisms, including self-enforcing contracts and third-party enforcement.     

Testing the “Inverted‐U” Phenomenon in Moral Development on Recently Promoted Senior Managers and Partners*

This paper examines the change in the average level of moral development over a 7.5‐year period of promotion, attrition, and survival in five Big 6 firms. The study improves upon previous cross‐sectional studies that found decreases in the average level of moral development at the senior manager and partner levels, which has been referred to as the “inverted‐U” phenomenon. Problems with these studies that limit the generalizability of their findings include their cross‐sectional nature and samples that usually come from one or two firms. Over a 7.5‐year period, we found that the participating Big 6 firms retained auditors with higher average levels of moral development (measured using the defining issues test), while those with lower average levels left the firms. The average level of moral development for new partners was at least as high as the group from which they came. This research suggests that the concern about Big 6 firms retaining a higher proportion of auditors with lower moral development may be an artifact of research design.